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from other jurisdictions to conclude that the "industrial purposes"
exception applied to the Kim's nursery. The court also rejected the
DOE's second argument because the noncommercial garden provision
differs from the Kim's commercial garden irrigation uses. Finally, the
court rejected the DOE's third argument because the DOE interpreted
the statute and applied it differently than in the past. An agency may
not alter the plain meaning of a statute to cater to changed societal
conditions. The legislature must amend the statute to properly
remedy a statute's application to changing societal needs.
Thus, the court reversed the superior court's ruling, and held that
the Kim's nursery fell within the industrial exception.
Adriano Martinez
McNally v. Zadra, No. 20426-0-III, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 68 (Wash.
Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003) (holding plaintiff landowners' rights in water
system passed appurtenant to their land; plaintiff landowners' efforts
to promote their shared water system's continued use complied with
easement agreement; and defendant landowner forfeited rights in the
water system by drilling a private well).
Plaintiffs William and Melody McNally ("McNallys") owned Lots C
and D, among other property, located adjacent to defendant Elizabeth
Zadra ("Zadra"), the owner of Lot A. Significantly, the lots shared a
water system which included buried water lines spanning across the
lots and a cistern on Lot A. The parties' predecessor in interest
conveyed the lots by real estate contract establishing appurtenant
easement rights in the water system. A few years later, the parties'
predecessor reassigned the rights in the water system to Lot 3. In
1993, Mr. McNally disconnected power to the pump house on his land
and removed the water line from the cistern located on Zadra's lot to
make repairs to the water system. As a result, a series of disputes
transpired between the landowners including issues of ownership and
responsibility for the water system.
The McNallys sued Zadra alleging the right to receive water by
running it over Zadra's lot. In 1996, the Superior Court of Stevens
County granted the McNallys' motion for partial summary judgment,
holding the easement in the water system was appurtenant to the
McNallys' land; therefore, it passed to them as a matter of law. The
McNallys also claimed Zadra drilled a separate well and should forfeit
her rights in the water system. The McNallys sought damages and
equitable relief for Zadra's interference with their easement rights.
Zadra counterclaimed alleging breach of water and road easements,
trespass, outrage, conversion and trespass to chattels. Subsequently, at
a bench trial in 1999, the trial court concluded the McNallys had not
breached the easement agreement and Zadra's separately drilled well
effectively relinquished her rights in the water system. As such, she was
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not entitled damages and thus could not mitigate by drilling her own
well.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Three,
Panel Two examined two partial grants of summary judgment.
Specifically, the court considered whether the water system easement
was appurtenant to Lots C and D, and whether the parties may offer
evidence to establish the parties intended the rights of the water
system easement to be assigned differently than stated in the easement
agreement. In addition, the court addressed trial court's findings of
fact.
First, the court explained that an appurtenant easement "applies to
a specific parcel of land" and that such easements "inhere in the land
and cannot exist separate from it; nor can [the easement] be
converted into and easement in gross." By way of example, the court
noted in Pitman v. Sweeney an appurtenant easement expressly
mentions the land it is "intended to benefit." Here, the easement was
established for the benefit for Lots A, B, C and D. As such, the court
recognized the McNallys, as purchasers of Lots C and D, were entitled
to the benefits of the appurtenant water system easement.
Second, the court found inadmissible any evidence offered to show
the parties' predecessors intended for water system rights to be
assigned differently than provided for by the easement agreement.
Under the context rule, as stated in Hollis v. Carwall, Inc., extrinsic
evidence is not admissible if offered to prove "an intention
independent of the instrument." Despite such a restriction, Zadra
attempted to submit affidavit testimony from the creator of the
easement agreement. However, the court excluded the affidavit which
attempted to show intent contradictory to the easement agreement
and noted McNallys' deed expressly established Lots C and D's
beneficial use of the water system. Accordingly, the court concurred
with the decision below and excluded Zadra's proffered evidence as
"inadmissible under the context rule."
Next, the court held the water system easement inhered in the
land and was appurtenant to Lots A, B, C and D such that no legal
instrument could reassign the rights. The court explained, all
easement rights existed "appurtenant to the property itself' and passed
exclusively to owners of Lots A, B, C and D. Despite the assignment of
water system rights to Lot 3 by Zadra's predecessor in interest, the
court found that such an assignment could not convert the easement
already annexed to Lots A, B, C and D. The easement passed to the
owners of Lots C and D by deed, and Zadra's predecessor in interest's
attempted assignment failed to dilute the McNallys rights in the water
system.
Finally, the court concluded all findings by the trial court were
"supported by substantial evidence," and, even if erroneous, were not
prejudicial.
Specifically, the court examined Zadra's claim for
damages. The court determined Mr. McNally did not breach the
easement agreement when he disconnected power to the pump house,
requested retroactive power service payments, and removed the water
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line from the cistern. No breach of the easement terms occurred
because Mr. McNally undertook such action to ensure continued use
of the shared water system, a right he enjoyed under the easement
agreement. Accordingly, Zadra was not entitled to damages for breach
of the easement agreement and thus could not mitigate by drilling a
separate well.
Still in effect, the easement agreement required forfeiture of
interest in the water system if the users "secure or obtain a working
well." The court noted Zadra's separately drilled well satisfied her use
requirements of the water system; therefore, her duty to forfeit rights
in the shared system was not excused.
Thus, the court affirmed the superior court's holding in favor of
the McNallys.
J Reid Bumgarner

O'Hagan v. Kelley, No. 262274-, 2002 Wash App. LEXIS 3192 (Wash.
Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002) (holding that to establish an injury from
decreased water level due to an excavation project, plaintiff must
establish the excavation project caused the decreased water level and
not merely that the water level fell after they completed excavating).
The O'Hagans, the Kelleys, and the Hulberts jointly used water
from Deer Creek in Pacific County.
In 1993, Pacific County
authorized the Pacific County Drainage District ("PCDD") to excavate
a drainage ditch from Deer Creek. During the excavation project,
Brian Hulbert, the PCDD commissioner, selected the excavation site.
After PCDD completed the excavation project, the water level fell
below the O'Hagan's culvert. Consequently, the O'Hagans sued
Pacific County, PCDD, and the Hulberts for diverting water,
negligently or intentionally, from the O'Hagans' property.
Additionally, the O'Hagans sued the Kelleys for moving their diversion
point, which the O'Hagans claimed also diverted water from their
property. The Pacific County Superior Court found the Kelleys had
moved their diversion point and diverted water from the O'Hagan's
property. However, the superior court granted summary judgment to
Pacific County and PCDD on the negligence claim, finding they did
not owe the O'Hagans a special duty. The superior court also
dismissed the remaining claims against Pacific County, PCDD, and the
Hulberts, finding the O'Hagans did not establish the excavation
altered the flow of Deer Creek. The O'Hagans appealed to the
Washington Court of Appeals, challenging the superior court's grant
of summary judgment and dismissal.
The appellate court first addressed whether the superior court
correctly concluded the excavation project did not cause the water
level to fall. The superior court found the Deer Creek water level fell
below the culvert after PCDD completed the excavation project.
However, the superior court concluded that the Kelleys caused the

